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Elena Stancanelli*† 
November 2012 
Abstract 

Earlier studies conclude that spouses time their retirement closely together. Here, we exploit early 
retirement age legislation to identify the effect of own and spousal retirement on spouses’ hours of 
work.   The sample for the analysis includes over 85 000 French couples. We conclude that hours of 
work fall significantly upon own and partner’s retirement, for both spouses. The own effect is 
dramatically large and equal to a drop in hours worked of 65 to 77 per cent while the cross effects 
are small, suggesting an average reduction of one or two hours per week upon spousal retirement.   
 Résumé 
Les précédentes études ont conclu que les conjoints liaient leurs choix de départ en retraite. Ici, nous 
utilisons la législation sur les départs anticipés en retraite pour identifier les effets du choix de 
retraite d’un individu et de son conjoint sur le temps de travail d’un conjoint. L’échantillon de 
l’analyse comprend 85000 couples français. Nous en concluons que le temps de travail est 
significativement réduit par les choix propre et du conjoint de départ en retraite, et ce pour les deux 
conjoints. L’effet propre est très important et égal à une baisse des heures de travail de 65 à 77 pour 
cent tandis que l’effet croisé est faible, de l’ordre de une à deux heures en moyenne par  
semaine lors de la retraite du conjoint. 
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1. Introduction 
There is growing interest in the retirement strategies of individuals in a couple. Earlier studies 
conclude that spouses time their retirement closely together and this phenomenon is referred 
to in the economic literature as “joint retirement”. Here we exploit the early retirement law in 
France to investigate the causal effect of a spouse’s retirement on the other spouse’s hours of 
work, taking a regression discontinuity approach.   
The literature on joint retirement decisions of partners is growing fast. Earlier studies 
conclude that partners tend to retire together because of leisure complementarities and that 
financial incentives play a lesser role in explaining spouses’ joint retirement decisions (see, 
for example, Michael Hurd , 1990;  Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier , 2000; Maria 
Casanova, 2010 ).1 Recent work though highlights asymmetries in spouses’ retirement 
strategies. Gustman and Steinmeier (2009) incorporate partial retirement strategies in a 
discrete choice model of spouses’ retirement to conclude that in numerous situations 
individuals in a couple may decide to retire only if their spouse does not retire. Using data 
drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), they find that the increased labour force 
participation of American women has actually contributed to lower husbands’ hours of 
market work. Stancanelli and Van Soest (2012a) find striking asymmetries in the change in 
house work hours of partners upon retirement.  In addition, Stancanelli and Van Soest 
(2012b), using actual data on partners’ leisure hours, conclude that the increase in joint 
spouses’ leisure hours upon spousal retirement is much smaller than the increase in separate 
leisure.   
Institutions are likely to affect spouses’ retirement decisions. David Blau (1998) concludes, 
for example, that eliminating dual entitlement to social security benefits would have a 
significantly positive effect on the labour supply of married women and a negative one on 
husbands’ labour supply, though both effects would be small. Baker (2002) studies the effect 
of the introduction of an allowance for dependent spouses in the Canadian social security 
system, finding a negative effect on the participation rates of eligible women and their 
husbands .  Kanika Kapur and Jeannette Rogowski (2007) investigate the effect of employer-
provided retiree health insurance (assumed exogenous  by the authors) on the retirement 
 
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behaviour of dual-earners in the USA, findings evidence of asymmetric effects for partners: 
the wife’s health insurance increases joint retirement while the husband’s does not.  James 
Banks, Richard Blundell, and Maria Casanova Rivas (2010) compare retirement behaviour of 
American and British dual-earners  (using American husbands as a control group for British 
husbands) to conclude that British husbands are significantly more likely to retire when their 
wife reaches state pension age. These studies did not exploit exogenous variation in the 
retirement decision of both partners as we do here.   
In this paper, we study the causal effect of spouses’ retirement on spouses’ hours of work 
taking a regression discontinuity approach. Using a regression discontinuity approach has the 
advantage of being closer to a natural random experiment design than other quasi-
experimental methods (see, for example, David Lee and Thomas Lemieux, 2010, for a 
discussion). We use the discontinuity in each spouse’s retirement probability at the legal 
early-retirement age in France to identify the effect of retirement in our model. We also 
control for a 1993 policy change that increased the length of the pension contribution period 
required to be able to retire with the maximum (full) pension benefits for younger cohorts. 2 
The 1993 reform is likely to have reduced the probability to retire at the legal early retirement 
age for younger cohorts. Therefore, we specify an instrumental variable model of the effect of 
own and spousal retirement on spouses’ hours. The data for the analysis are drawn from the 
French Labour Force Surveys (LFS). We select a sample of dual-earners or retiree couples 
with both spouses aged between 50 and 70 years, encompassing over 85000 couples.  
We find evidence of large and significant jumps in the own retirement probability at the legal 
early retirement age for both the man and woman in a couple. The 1993 reform slightly 
reduced the probability of retirement at the early retirement age for married men while this 
effect was not significant for married women. The husband’s retirement probability increases 
slightly when the wife reaches early retirement age while her retirement probability is not 
responsive to his early retirement age. Finally, we conclude that hours fall significantly upon 
own and spousal retirement for both spouses. The own effect is dramatically large and equal 
to a drop in hours worked of 65 to 77 per cent while the cross effects are smaller, suggesting 
an average reduction of one or two hours per week upon spousal retirement.  
 
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2. The empirical model  
2.1 The RD design  
Our objective is to study the causal effect of spouses’ retirement on spouses’ hours. We are 
especially interested in the cross effects: does his (her) retirement after her (his) hours?  
Individuals’ hours decisions are unlikely to be independent from retirement decisions.  
Therefore, to identify the effect of retirement on hours of work, we exploit exogenous 
variation in retirement due to the discontinuity in the individual retirement probability at age 
60, which is the legal early retirement age for most workers in France.3  There are no other 
policies that affect individuals of age 60 in France; 4 and age presumably cannot be 
manipulated by the respondents. Moreover, we know the individual month and year of birth 
as well as the day, month and year of the interview, and retirement status is also measured on 
the day of the interview. We thus can assume that age is measured continuously.   
We use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach to identify retirement in the hours 
equations.  This approach has several advantages that have been carefully discussed by, for 
example, David Lee and Thomas Lemieux (2010), Wilbert van der Klaauw (2008), and 
Guido Imbens and Thomas Lemieux (2007). Essentially, because individuals close to the 
discontinuity cut-off (age 60 in our case) and situated on the two sides of the age cut-off are 
likely to be very similar, a regression discontinuity design is very close to an experimental 
design and requires fewer assumptions than, for example, other techniques such as 
differences-in-differences, which rely on finding a control group similar to the treatment 
group.  
Under an RD design, to estimate the effect of individual retirement, R (the binary treatment) 
on hours of work, H (the outcome variable), we would specify retirement as a function of 
 
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age, Ri  = f (agei), assuming that f (agei) is continuous on the two sides of the discontinuity at 
the legal early retirement age (60 years for most workers in France today) and that 
individuals cannot manipulate their age. Under a so-called “sharp” RD design, everyone 
would retire when they reach age 60 -the jump in the retirement probability at age 60 would 
be equal to one.  However, in practice some individuals may retire earlier, due to special 
sector-of-employment (early) retirement plans, and others may retire later, because they may 
not have accumulated enough pension contributions by the time they reach age 60 to be able 
to obtain maximum (full) pension benefits5 –and thus they will continue to work a few extra 
years past age 60 to retire later with larger pension benefits.  To account for this, we use a 
Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (FRD) design (see Jinyong Hahn, Petra Todd and Wilbert 
van der Klaauw, 2001, for more details of this approach) that allows for a jump greater than 
zero but less than one in the probability of retirement at the age cut-off of 60 years. The FRD 
design has also been used in the literature as an alternative to a sharp RD approach when 
there are variables that may affect the treatment (retirement here) but are not observed by the 
researcher.6   
Under a FRD  setup, the causal effect of retirement on hours is given by the following 
expression (see Jinyong Hahn, Petra Todd and Wilbert van der Klaauw,  2001, for proofs): 
 
 	
A A	
 
where   BCDEF      and   BCDEF     and 
the two limits A  BCDEF A     and A  BCDEF A   
exist.  The denominator is greater than zero and less than one, and the function Ri  = f (agei) is 
smooth on the two sides of the discontinuity. To estimate the effect of individual retirement  
on hours, given by  above, one can use an instrumental variable approach , namely two-stage 
least squares (see, Jinyong Hahn, Petra Todd and Wilbert van der Klaauw, for a proof; and 
 
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for example, David Card, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole Maestas (2009), or Battistini, et al. 
2009, for some applications). 
Let us then specify an equation for hours as follows:  
    + A +  Zi i + !
Jinyong Hahn, Petra Todd and Wilbert van der Klaauw (2001) show that the error term in this 
equation does not have to be uncorrelated with age for identification purposes.   
The first stage equation takes the following form: 
3)  Ri = Di ri + Agei Di ri + Agei (1-Di) ri + Zi ri + ri     
where the dummy Di  takes value one when the individual has reached age 60 and zero 
otherwise, Agei  is a flexible polynomial in age  (in the empirical specification, we use quartic 
polynomials in age of partners, thus n equals 4), and the vector Zi other contains individual 
characteristics.  The literature also uses, alternatively, the following expression for the first-
stage equation, which  results in the same value for the coefficient on D, although it does not 
allow explicitly for age polynomials on the two sides of the discontinuity: 
3a)  Ri = Di ri + Agei ri + Zi ri+ ri     
Combing equations 2 and 3, the reduced form equation for the effect of retirement on hours 
outcomes is:  
"   + Di hi + Agei Di hi + Agei (1-Di) hi +  Zi hi  + #$% 
and &'(   )
*+
),+
 
where  can be estimated using two-stage least squares, instrumenting R with D, and 
correcting the standard errors, as in Jinyong Hahn, Petra Todd and Wilbert van der Klaauw 
(2001).   
Allowing both spouses’ retirement to affect hours, equation 4 becomes: 
-   + Dm hm + Agem Dm hm + Agem (1-Dm) hm +  Zm hm  + Df hf + Agef Df hf + 
Agef (1-Df) hf +  Zf hf + #$% 
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where m stands for husband and f for wife, and i takes also value m or f, as we estimate this 
equation separately for hours of the husband and hours of the wife. The causal effect of 
retirement on spouses’ hours is then given, respectively by:  
6) &'(.   )*/
),/
     , &'(0  
)*1
),1
 
Because spouses are on average two years apart, we can identify both spouses’ retirement in 
the hours regression.   
Furthermore, we control for the reform introduced in 1993 that required younger cohorts of 
individuals, born after 1933, to contribute between one and ten extra quarters to the pension 
fund (depending on the year of birth) to be able to obtain maximum (full) pension benefits 
upon retirement. The 1993 reform also affected the amount of full pension benefits payable, 
by making this last a function of the best 25 years7 of wages instead of the best ten years of 
wages, which was the rule before 1993,  as well as by linking the benefits payable to the 
inflation rate instead of the wage growth rate. We model the 1993 reform using a differences-
in-differences approach, by defining cohorts born after 1933 as the treatment group and 
cohorts born in 1933 and earlier as the control group. The policy years are 1994 and later 
years and the control years, 1993 and earlier years, as the policy was announced in July 1993 
and implemented as from 1994. 8  The effect of the policy change on the retirement 
probability is captured by the interaction term between the treatment group dummy and the 
policy year dummy for each spouse, say “P93m” for the husband and “P93f” for the wife.  The 
standard assumption for the validity of this approach is that there are no other policy changes 
that affect the control and the treatment group (in different directions) during this period of 
time.  
The 1993 policy (by increasing the length of the pension contribution period required to 
obtain full pension benefits) is likely to have reduced the incentive to retire at the legal early 
retirement age. Here we allow the 1993 policy change to affect spouses’ retirement 
probabilities by including in our model full interactions of the “P93m” and “P93f” terms with 
all the Dm and all the Df terms –and we also include in the equations controls for birth cohorts 
 
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The data collection took place for each of the LFS surveys that we use here between January and May of the 
relevant year, with over 95 percent of the data being collected in March. In 1993, over 99 percent of the 
interview took place in March.   
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and years (see Table A in the Appendix for full set of results).  Then, Equation 5 above 
becomes: 
2   + Dm lm + Agem Dm lm + Agem (1-Dm) lm + Dm  P93m p93m + Agem Dm P93m 

p93m
 + Agem (1-Dm) P93m p93m + Zm hm  + treatm tm   + Df lf + Agef Df lf + Agef (1-Df) lf 
+ Df P93f p93f +Agef Df P93f p93f + Agef (1-Df) P93f p93f + Zf hf + treatf tf #$% 
and we estimate this equation separately for hours of the husband and hours of the wife. The 
causal effect of retirement on hours of spouses is given by3 
4&'(.  
)5/
),/
6
)789/
),/
     , &'(0  
)51
),1
6
)7891
),1
. 
    3. The data 
The data for the analysis are drawn from the French Labour Force Surveys (LFS) 1990-2002. 
We use this sample cut for a number of reasons. First of all, these yearly surveys are highly 
comparable over time as they use the same questionnaire, the same data collection method 
(personal interviews at the respondent’s home) and the same sample design approach.  The 
LFS series was broken in 2003 to comply with Eurostat requirements.  The recent LFS series 
(as from 2003) are carried out quarterly and most of them are done by telephone; and the 
questionnaire and the sample design have changed dramatically relative to the earlier 1990-
2002 surveys. In addition, another reform of the length of the pension contribution period 
took place in 2003, exactly at the time of the break in the LFS series.     
Therefore, we select a sample of couples from the 1990-2002 yearly LFS as follows: 
• Individuals were matched to their partner if any 
• Single people were dropped from the sample 
• Same sex couples were dropped from the sample  
• Multi-couple households were also dropped 
• Records from different survey years were pooled together. 
This gave a sample of 588 654 couples. We selected couples for the analysis as follows:  
1. -Both partners were aged between 50 and 70 (see below for our measure of age), 
which gave a sample of 148 395 couples. 
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2. -Both were dual-earners or retirees (dropping other inactive partners, i.e. dropping 
60127 couples) 
3. -Couples were formally married (we dropped 2795 cohabitant couples).  
This gave a final sample of 85 473 couples.  To apply a regression discontinuity approach we 
use ten year bounds on the two sides of the discontinuity, at age 60, which is the legal early 
retirement age for most workers in France. We also test for the robustness of the results to 
selecting narrower bandwidths on the two sides of the age discontinuity.  
The LFS collects month and year of birth together with records of the day, month and year of 
the interview.  Therefore, we construct a continuous measure of age on the day of the 
interview. Retirement status is measured on the interview date. We exploit two different 
measures of hours based on the following two questions: 
 Usual weekly hours of work 
 Actual hours of work in the past week  
Education refers to completed years of education.  The reference category includes 
individuals with only an elementary education.  As mentioned before, individuals with higher 
levels of education are likely to enter the labour market later and thus to postpone retirement.  
The number of children comprises children younger than 18 years at the time of the survey. 
This variable may affect retirement as individuals with younger children are probably less 
likely to retire since retirement induces a drop in income (pension benefits are smaller than 
earnings).  Besides, the presence of relatively young children may also affect work hours.  
The most disaggregated area of residence available in the survey is the department. France is 
divided into 22 regions that are further subdivided into 95 departments - without considering 
the overseas territories (French Guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, Ile de la Reunion) 
that were not covered by these surveys.  The level of the unemployment rate may affect the 
individual retirement probability as, for example, employers may encourage older workers to 
retire  in recessionary times.  Therefore, we construct a measure of the local unemployment 
rate, using the level of the departmental unemployment rate in the year before each survey 
was carried out –which gives 95 department *13 survey values for the local unemployment 
rate. 
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We also include year dummies in all the regressions of the model to capture macroeconomic 
changes like the secular increase in female labour supply. Year and cohort dummies also 
serve as controls for the differences-in-differences specification.  
Finally, the survey provides information on the day of the month the survey was carried out.  
Firms typically have to satisfy orders by a certain day of the month. Therefore, the day of the 
month is likely to affect hours and we include it in the regressions. Because over 95 per cent 
(and over 99 percent in some years) of the LFS interviews were carried out in March of each 
year, we do not use the month of the survey.     
4. Descriptive statistics and exploratory analysis 
Descriptive statistics of the main sample for analysis, including married couples  who are 
dual-earner or retirees, with both spouses aged 50 to 70 years, are provided in Table 1.10  The 
wife is on average 2 years younger than the husband.  About 60 percent of married men and 
48 percent of married women in our sample are aged 60 or above.  Half of our sample have  
an elementary school diploma, which is the reference category for the education dummies in 
the econometric model. About 30 percent of the men and 27 percent of the women have only 
completed middle school; while about 6 percent of the men and 8.5 percent of the women 
have only a high school diploma. The proportion of college graduates is slightly larger for 
men, (10 percent) than for women (8 percent).  We know that the proportion of college 
graduates increases over time and does so faster for women than for men, so that in recent 
years this pattern is reversed (we control for year dummies in the regressions).  About 97 
percent of the spouses had a French nationality.  The average number of children younger 
than 18 years is 0.30 (remember the couples in the sample are aged between 50 and 70 years).  
The local unemployment rate was equal to 9 percent on average. As mentioned before (see 
Section 3), there is a lot of variation in the unemployment rate, which is allowed to vary over 
the 95 French departments and over the thirteen years covered by the sample.  Finally, about 
63 percent of men and 50 percent of women had retired from work. According to the 
definition of hours used (usual weekly hours or hours of work in the past week, see Section 3)  
the average of usual (past-week) hours, for those still working was 42 (40) for men and 34 
(31) for women.  The corresponding figures when also averaging in instances of zero hours 
were, respectively, 12 (15) hours for men and 14 (15) hours for women.   
 
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the Z variables in our model (see Section 2) for 
compliers (retirees) and non-compliers (employed persons) on the two sides of the 
discontinuity (below and above age 60).11 As anticipated (see Section 2), college educated 
spouses are less likely to retire at early retirement age.  The number of dependent children 
also correlates negatively with retiring early. As a test that the covariates included in the 
instrumental variable model (the Z) are not discontinuous at age 60 we also plots the 
predicted retirement probability including only the Z among the regressors  (see later). 
To graphically explore the discontinuity in spouses’ retirement at the legal early retirement 
age, as is usually done in the RD literature, we plot the retirement probability against age on 
the two sides of the age cut-off, using bins of ten month size, as is usually done in the RD 
literature (see top panels of Charts 1). We find very large jumps in spouses’ retirement as a 
function of own age.13   
We also explore graphically the continuity of the other covariates–the Z vector in the notation 
of Section 2- by plotting the age profile of the predicted retirement  probability, estimated 
including only the Z covariates among the regressors (see bottom panels of Charts 1).  On the 
basis of this evidence, we can conclude that the Z variables are indeed continuous at age 60. 
Non-parametric evidence on the behaviour of the retirement probability on the two sides of 
the age cut-off point is also gathered in Charts 2, where the probability of retirement is 
estimated as a function of smoothed local polynomials in age on the two-sides of the age cut-
off.  We repeat the analysis for own age ((left-hand charts in Charts 2) and spouse’s age 
(right-hand charts in Charts 2), by letting the retirement probability vary, respectively, as a 
function of own-age polynomials (left-hand charts) or, alternatively, spouse’s age 
polynomials (right-hand charts).  We also plot 95 confidence bounds around each curve –
notice that given the large sample size the confidence bounds basically coincide with the 
predicted probability curves.  We find large jumps in the own retirement probability upon 
reaching age 60.  We also observe small jumps in the husband’s retirement probability when 
the wife reaches age 60; and, vice-versa, in the wife’s retirement probability when the 
husband reaches age 60.     
 

)AEC'**E!A:CDC***D,A!		AA	CCA	CA	BDC	*AE1!AE-	DAECA,	*D1		
7		DCADE90

)+-!A	CA1CADEDBA!EE!A!+DEAED1	*:1!AE-DAE1!AE-AECA,
	*D1		A	*DCC!AEC	AEC'**E!A:0
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.74
4

Charts 3 (and Charts 4) provide similar information for usual week hours (past-week hours of 
work). Hours drop dramatically for both spouses at the legal early retirement age cut-off. We 
also detect a small drop in the hours of the husband when the wife is aged 720 months or 
more; and, vice-versa, we see a small drop in her hours when he is aged 720 months or more.  
The 95 confidence bounds are very close to the predicted probability curves and never cross, 
thus suggesting that the cross effects are statistically significant for both spouses. 
Finally, we discuss some exploratory analysis of the changes in the retirement probability of 
spouses following the 1993 policy change, which essentially required younger cohorts born 
after 1933 to pay longer pension contribution periods to be able to receive maximum (full) 
pension benefits upon retirement (see Section 2).  The policy change was voted in the 
summer of 1993 and it came into force in 1994.  The LFS surveys 1990-2002 were carried 
between January and May of each year, and over 95 percent of these yearly interviews were 
carried out in the month of March –in particular, in 1993, over 99 percent of the respondents 
were interviewed in March.  Therefore, we assume that 1994 and later years are “policy” 
year, and 1990 to 1993 are “control” years (see Section 2). Because the policy hit younger 
cohorts, spouses in the treatment group are on average more educated and have more children 
than those in the control group (see Table D in the Appendix).  However, one can reasonably 
assume that in the absence of the 1993 reform, the retirement probabilities of the spouses in 
the two groups would have evolved in a comparable manner14.  
According to the raw estimates of the retirement effect of the 1993 policy change, 
respectively, for husbands and wives, in the policy year, 1994, over the first three years of 
implementation of the policy, 1994-1996, and over all of the policy years included in our 
sample, 1994-2002 (see Table E in the Appendix), the effect of the 1993 policy change on the 
retirement probability of both spouses was small, negative and decreasing over time. The 
probit (marginal) estimates, including among the covariates education and nationality 
dummies, the number of children and the local unemployment rate,  indicate an average 
reduction on the retirement probability of 0.039 for married men and between 0.027 and 
0.045 for married women (see Table F in the Appendix).  The raw estimates of the cross 
retirement effect of the 1993 policy change, i.e. the effect on the retirement probability of the 
husband if the wife was affected by the policy change; and vice-versa, the effect on the 
retirement probability of the wife if the husband was  affected by the policy change are 
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significantly negative though quite small for married women; while they are not always 
significant for married men (see Table G in the Appendix).   
To conclude, the descriptive evidence gathered confirms earlier findings (see Bozio, 2004) 
that the 1993 policy change delayed retirement of individuals. In particular, we expect that 
this policy change reduced the chances to retire at the legal early retirement age for the 
spouses hit by the policy. Therefore, we combine (interact) in our econometric model 
controls for the discontinuity at the legal early retirement age with controls for the effect of 
the 1993 policy change (see Section 2 and Table A in the Appendix for full results).  
5. Estimation Results 
First of all, we provide results of estimation of first stage regressions of spouses’ retirement. 
Next, the results of estimation of the instrumental variable models are presented (see Section 
2). 
Table 3 presents the results of estimation of ‘first stage’ models of the retirement probability 
of the two spouses, including and excluding controls for the 1993 policy change (see Section 
2) or other covariates.  The full set of estimates is provided in Table A of the Appendix, 
where it is shown that many of the interaction terms with the age polynomials are significant, 
suggesting that the fuzzy approach is indeed the right one in this context.   
The first block of results in Table 3 (specification 1) indicates that the own retirement 
probability increases significantly upon reaching age 60, on average by 0.23 (0.27 minus 
0.04) for the husband and 0.28 for the wife. This represents an increase in the retirement 
probability at the discontinuity of 51 per cent for married men and 64 per cent for married 
women. 15 The size of these estimates is robust to including or excluding covariates. 
Dropping the 1993 policy terms, the estimates are slightly larger and equal, respectively, to 
0.25 for man and 0.29 for women. Narrowing the size of the sample on the two sides of the 
discontinuity (to couples with both spouses aged between 56 and 64), the estimates get 
smaller and equal, respectively, to 0.21 for men and 0.19 for women (see specification 2 in 
Table 3). Restricting the sample to the pre- policy 1993 reform years (specification 3 in Table 
3), the estimates are a little larger, and equal, respectively, to 0.29 for married men and 0.30 
for married women.  While considering only the post-policy 1993 years (specification 4 of 
 
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Table 3), the increase in the retirement probability upon reaching age 60 is about 0.24 for 
married men and 0.28 for married women, which is very close to our main specification (as 
the data cover more post- policy years than pre -policy years). Therefore, this last set of 
results confirms that the 1993 policy reduced the size of the jump in the retirement 
probability at the legal early retirement age, and especially so for men. In particular, we find 
that the 1993 reform reduces the probability to retire at age 60 by 0.04 for married men, 
though this effect is only significant at the ten per cent level (see specification 1 in Table 3) 
while the effect is not significant for married women. However, many of the coefficients on 
the interaction terms of the 1993 policy with the age polynomials are significant (see Table 
A), suggesting that the 1993 policy reform affected the wife’s retirement probability although 
it did not change her probability to retire at the early retirement age. In contrast, the estimated 
effect for married men is very close to that obtained for the retirement probability of the 
population of  married men in the LFS sample, which is equal to 0.039 (see Table F in the 
Appendix, and Section 4 for more details), suggesting perhaps that most of the effect of the 
1993 reform for men was to reduce the propensity to retire at early retirement age.    
Coming to the cross effects (the effect of the spouse being aged at least 60 on the own 
retirement probability), the retirement probability of the husband increases significantly when 
the wife reaches the legal early retirement age, according to our main specification 
(specification 1 of Table 3), though the increase is only weakly significant and quite small in 
size, equal to 0.03. In particular, the cross effect of her being aged at least 60 on his 
retirement probability is robust to dropping the 1993 policy terms from our specification. 
However, splitting the sample into pre and post policy years, we find that this cross effect 
was a little larger and equal to 0.04 in the pre-policy period while in the post-policy years it is 
no longer significant. The effect becomes also insignificant when dropping covariates or 
narrowing the sample size.  Her retirement probability on the other hand does not increase 
when he reaches legal retirement age. This is perhaps because the average wife in the sample 
is two years younger than the husband. 
More robustness checks are shown in Table 4. In specification 5, we included only controls 
for the own (husband’s or wife’s) characteristics and age. The estimates of the effect of 
reaching age 60 on the own retirement probability are very close to those of our main 
specification for the first stage regression, and equal, respectively, to about 0.27 for either 
partner.  The interaction effect of the 1993 policy change with  the age-60–and- above 
dummy  is very close in size to our main specification but not statistically significant. 
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Next, we experimented with selecting a subsample of couples with the wife being at least two 
years older than the husband (specification 6 of Table 4).  For this sample, the estimated 
increase in the retirement probability of the husband upon reaching age 60 is much smaller 
than in our main specification and equal to 0.12, suggesting that when the wife is presumably 
the first to retire, the husband has a smaller incentive to retire at the early retirement age - 
relative to situations where he is the first to retire (the average husband in our main sample is 
two years older than the wife).  As far as the wife, her probability to retire at the early 
retirement age is a little larger than for the main sample and equal to 0.31. The cross effect of 
her reaching age 60 on his retirement probability becomes now statistically insignificant -
while the cross effect of his reaching age 60 on her retirement probability stays not 
significant.    
In contrast, in specification 7 (Table 4), we selected a larger sample of couples than our main 
sample now including other inactive spouses, such as the unemployed, the disabled, or 
housewives. For this sample, the probability to retire at the legal retirement age increases by 
0.28 (0.33 minus 0.05) for men and by 0.09 for women.  The probability to retire at the early 
retirement age for women is very small, probably due to having included so many 
housewives in the sample. The 1993 policy interaction term with the age-60-and-above 
dummy is strongly significant and negative for men while it is negative but not significant for 
women.  None of the cross retirement effects are significant when including other inactive 
spouses in the sample.  
Finally, results of estimation of the reduced form hours equations are given in Table 5. We 
alternatively use two definitions of hours: usual week hours of work and actual hours of work 
in the past week. For either definition, we show a selected set of estimates for our main 
sample and for the subsample of couples with both spouses aged 56 to 64.  We find 
dramatically large drops in own hours upon retirement for both spouses: the estimated size of 
the reduction in own hours upon own retirement is in the range of 65 to 77%.  In particular, 
the reduction in own usual week hours upon own retirement is equal to 77% for both spouses. 
The cross effect of a spouse’s retirement on own hours  is strongly  significant, though small 
in size, varying between 2 and 5 per cent depending on the definition of hours adopted and 
the sample cut. For usual hours and for the main sample, his hours drop by less than 2 per 
cent upon her retirement, and her hours drop by 5.5 per cent upon his retirement (see 
specification 1 of Table 5). Narrowing the sample size on the two sides of the discontinuity to 
spouses aged 56 to 64 years (specification 2 of Table 5), the effects are comparable in terms 
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of significance and size. In particular, his past week hours fall by 2 per cent when she retires 
and her past week hours fall by 4 per cent upon his retirement. The estimates of the effect of 
own and cross retirement on spouses’ actual hours of work in the past week ((specification 3 
of Table 5), are also very similar. His past-week hours fall by 76 per cent upon his retirement 
and her past-week hours fall by 69% upon her retirement. If she retires, his past-week hours 
fall by 4 per cent and if he retires, her past-week hours fall by 3 per cent.  These effects are 
robust to narrowing the sample size on the two sides of the age 60 cut-off (see specification 4 
of Table 5).   
A number of further robustness checks were carried out. In Table 6, we provide similar 
estimates for the specification without controls for the 1993 policy change. The estimates of 
the own and cross retirement effects on hours are very close to those of our main 
specification. Table 7 provides comparable estimates for the subsample of couples with the 
wife at least two years older than the husband.  For this subsample, the cross effect of her 
retirement on his hours is much larger than for the main sample, and equal, respectively, to 7 
per cent for usual hours, and to 8 per cent for past week hours; while the cross effect of his 
retirement on her hours is smaller (and not significant for usual hours).  Finally, in Table 8, 
we present similar estimates for the larger sample, including other inactive spouses. For this 
larger sample, the effect of effect of her retirement on her hours is smaller, while that of his 
retirement on his hours is larger in relative terms. The cross effect of his retirement on her 
hours is larger, while that of her retirement on his hours is smaller than for our main 
specification. 
Conclusions 
The objective of this study is to estimate the causal effect of spouses’ retirement on spouses’ 
hours of work. We exploit legal early retirement age in France and use a regression 
discontinuity approach, to identify the spouses’ retirement in our model.   
The model is estimated with data on over 85 000 dual-earner couples with spouses aged 50 to 
70.  Exploratory graphical analysis indicates very large jumps in the own retirement 
probability at the legal early retirement age for both spouses.  The retirement probability also 
jumps up when the partner reaches age 60 (cross effects), though these cross effects are much 
smaller than the own effects. Own hours are found to fall dramatically with own retirement 
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and to decrease further with spousal retirement –suggesting negative cross effects of a 
partner’s retirement on own hours.   
Parametric estimation confirms these findings. We find evidence of large and significant 
jumps in the own retirement probability at the legal early retirement age for both men and 
women in a couple. The 1993 reform, which increased the length of the pension contribution 
period, slightly reduced the probability to retire at the early retirement age for married men 
but not for married women. The husband’s retirement probability increases slightly when the 
wife reaches early retirement age, while her retirement probability is not responsive to his 
early retirement age. Selecting a subsample of couples where the wife is at least two years 
older than the husband (the average wife in the sample is two years younger than the 
husband), the cross effect of her reaching age 60 on his retirement probability becomes now 
statistically insignificant -while the cross effect of his reaching age 60 on her retirement 
probability stays not significant. 
These asymmetries in joint retirement strategies of spouses are in line with the conclusions of 
recent literature for the United States. Moreover, when spouses can join (private) pension 
plans together they may have stronger incentives to time their retirement closely than under a 
system of separate (public) pension schemes such as the French one. However, the man and 
the woman in a couple may opt for reducing hours rather than fully retire from work when 
their spouse retires. Here we conclude indeed that hours fall significantly upon own and 
partner’s retirement for both spouses. The own effect is dramatically large and equal to a drop 
in hours of work in the range of 65 to 77 per cent at age 60 and above. In contrast, the cross 
effects are small, though strongly significant, suggesting an average reduction of one or two 
hours per week upon spousal retirement.  To conclude, the evidence gathered in this study 
suggests that both the man and the woman in a couple reduce significantly their working 
hours when their spouse retires but this effect is small.  
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Table 1.   Sample descriptive     
  Husband Wife 
  Mean Standard dev. Mean Standard dev. 
Age 61.233 5.467 59.279 5.526 
    
Age 60 and above 0.597 0.490 0.476 0.499 
    
Elementary School 0.523 0.499 0.564 0.495 
    
Middle School 0.298 0.457 0.266 0.442 
    
High School  0.066 0.249 0.085 0.279 
    
College 0.109 0.312 0.081 0.274 
    
French 0.971 0.166 0.978 0.146 
    
Retired 0.635 0.481 0.508 0.499 
    
Usual week Hours >0  42.18  12.861 33.90 13.72 
    
Past week Hours (if 
usual week hours >0) 40.08 18.39 30.87 17.74 
Usual week Hours 12.34 20.42 14.36 18.98 
Past week hours 14.95 22.40 15.08 19.80 
  Couple's characteristics   
Mean Standard dev.   
Children number 0.325 0.652   
    
Local U rate  9.222 2.36   
    
Observations no. 85473       
Note:  The sample includes dual-earner or retiree married couples with both 
spouses aged 50 to 70 (extremes included).  
The local U rate is the year (t-1) unemployment rate at the department level 
(there are 95 departments). U rate varies across departments and over the 13 
LFS years.  
 
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Table 2.  Sample descriptives by retirement status on the two sides of the age cut-off 
  Men in a Couple   
  Not Retired Retired  Not Retired  Retired 
  Age 50-59 Age 50-59 Age 60-70 Age 60-70 
Elementary School 0.366 0.463 0.445 0.628 
  (0.481) (0.498) (0.497) (0.483) 
Middle School  0.382 .0376 0.193 0.245 
  (0.485) (0.484) (0.395) (0.430) 
High School 0.083 0.077 0.082 0.054 
  (0.277) (0.267) (0.275) (0.226) 
College 0165 0.082 0.276 0.070 
  (0.371) (0.274) (0.276) (0.255) 
French 0.963 0.979 0.947 0.976 
  (0.187) (0.143) (0.222) (0.151) 
Children number 0.588 0.323 0.353 0.170 
  (0.813) (0.624) (0.669) (0.474) 
Local U rate 9.107  9.263 9.128 9.290 
   (2.350) (2.367) (2.336) (2.365) 
Observations no. 28334 6053 2829 48257 
  Women in a Couple   
  Not Retired Retired  Not Retired  Retired 
  Age 50-59 Age 50-59 Age 60-70 Age 60-70 
Elementary School 0.479 0.421 0.654 0.667 
  (0.499) (0.493) (0.475) (0.470) 
Middle School  0.309 0.302 0.188 0.224 
  (0.462) (0.459) (0.391) (0.417) 
High School 0.101 0.135 0.072 0.062 
  (0.301) (0.342) (0.259) (0.241) 
College 0.108 0.140 0.081 0.044 
  (0.311) (.347) (0.273) (0.205) 
French 0.969 0.983 0.961 0.987 
  (0.171) (0.127) (0.193) 0.111) 
Children number 0.537 0.272 0.238 0.124 
  (0.788) (0.601) (0.548) (0.397) 
Local U rate 9.114 9.223  9.296 9.326 
  (2.338) (2.391) (2.359) (2.373) 
Observations no. 38319 6392 3653 37109 
Note:  The sample includes dual-earner and retiree spouses aged 50 to 70.  
             The total sample size is 85473 observations.   







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Chart 1. Discontinuities at age 60 in retirement  and covariates other than age.
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Table 3.  Linear Retirement Probability: first stage regressions    
1) Dual-earner or retiree spouses aged 50 to 70 included. Couples 85473.   
  He Retires   She Retires He Retires   She Retires He Retires   She Retires 
He Age 60 and above= Dm 0.273*** -0.0115 0.270*** -0.0132 0.254*** 0.00120 
  (0.0209) (0.0179) (0.0210) (0.0180) (0.0148) (0.0124) 
She Age 60 and above=Df 0.0276* 0.277*** 0.0249 0.277*** 0.0209** 0.289*** 
  (0.0154) (0.0214) (0.0155) (0.0215) (0.0103) (0.0152) 
P93* He Age 60 and above   -0.0421* 0.0215 -0.0407* 0.0236   
  (0.0238) (0.0211) (0.0240) (0.0211)   
P93* She Age 60 and 
above -0.0117 -0.00332 -0.00447 -0.00201   
  (0.0175) (0.0248) (0.0177) (0.0247)   
Covariates (Z) yes yes no no yes yes 
2) Dual-earner or retiree spouses aged 56 to 64 included.  Couples 20836.   
  He Retires   She Retires He Retires   She Retires He Retires   She Retires 
He Age 60 and above= Dm 0.210*** 0.00321   
  (0.0438) (0.0404)   
She Age 60 and above=Df 0.0347 0.199***   
  (0.0340) (0.0445)   
P93* He Age 60 and above   -0.0585 -0.00352   
  (0.0471) (0.0455)   
P93* She Age 60 and 
above -0.0145 -0.0124   
  (0.0371) (0.0489)   
Covariates (Z) yes yes no no yes yes 
3) Dual-earner or retiree spouses aged 50 to 70 included, years 1990 to 1993 included. Couples 24050.   
  He Retires   She Retires He Retires   She Retires He Retires   She Retires 
He Age 60 and above= Dm 0.294*** 0.00190 
  (0.0277) (0.0227) 
She Age 60 and above=Df 0.0451** 0.303*** 
  (0.0201) (0.0278) 
Covariates (Z) yes yes no no yes yes 
4) Dual-earner or retiree spouses aged 50 to 70 included, years 1994 to 2002 included. Couples 61423.   
  He Retires   She Retires He Retires   She Retires He Retires   She Retires 
He Age 60 and above= Dm 0.238*** 0.00200 
  (0.0174) (0.0147) 
She Age 60 and above=Df 0.00978 0.282*** 
  (0.0120) (0.0182) 
Covariates (Z) yes yes no no yes yes 
*** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent and * at the 10 per cent. The covariates included  
are spouses’ French nationality and education dummies, number of children, local unemployment rate, year and cohort dummies. 
 
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Table 4.  Linear Retirement Probability: first stage regressions    
  More specifications   
5) Dual-earner or retiree with both spouses aged 50 to 70 included. Couples 85473.    
 Including only his (her) covariates and his (her) age variables among the regressors; not accounting for hers (his) covariates.  
  He Retires She Retires 
  
He Age 60 and above= Dm 0.268*** 
  
  (0.0209) 
  
She Age 60 and above=Df 0.276*** 
  
  (0.0215) 
  
P93* He Age 60 and above   -0.0349   
  (0.0237) 
  
P93* She Age 60 and above 0.000857 
  
  (0.0247) 
  
Covariates (Z) Yes yes   
6) Dual-earner or retiree with both spouses aged 50 to 70 and with the wife at least two years older than the husband. Couples 7977.  
  He Retires She Retires 
  
He Age 60 and above= Dm 0.128* -0.0348 
  
  (0.0677) (0.0545) 
  
She Age 60 and above=Df 0.0632 0.311*** 
  
  (0.0612) (0.0743) 
  
P93* He Age 60 and above   -0.000233 0.0820 
  
  (0.0742) (0.0587) 
  
P93* She Age 60 and above -0.0632 0.0735 
  
  (0.0743) (0.0852) 
  
Covariates (Z) Yes Yes   
7) Dual-earner or retiree or other inactive spouses aged 50 to 70 included. Couples 143982.   
  He Retires She Retires 
  
He Age 60 and above= Dm 0.330*** -0.00170   
  (0.0149) (0.0155)   
She Age 60 and above=Df 0.00366 0.0897***   
  (0.0117) (0.0143)   
P93* He Age 60 and above   -0.0501*** 0.0244   
  (0.0175) (0.0188)   
P93* She Age 60 and above -0.00287 -0.00368   
  (0.0137) (0.0168)   
Covariates (Z) Yes Yes   
*** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent and * at the 10 per cent. The covariates included  are 
spouses’ French nationality and education dummies, number of children, local unemployment rate, year and cohort dummies. 
 
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Table 5 .  The effect of spouses'retirement on spouses' hours. Instrumental variable estimates (2SLS GMM estimates).  
  His Usual Hours Her Usual Hours   
1) Main sample Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement -33.09*** -77.11 -2.15*** -5.5 
  (0.197) (0.216) 
  
Her Retirement -0.74*** -1.61 -28.20*** -77.47 
  (0.151) (0.185)   
Underindentification test 1.2e+04*** 1.2e+04***   
Overidentification test 98.57*** 256.58***   
Observations 85473 85473   
Mean for spouses aged 59 to < 60  19.31 16.38   
  His Usual Hours Her Usual Hours   
2) Spouses aged 56-64 years Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement -32.79*** -76.41  -1.577*** -4.04 
  (0.443) (0.408) 
  
Her Retirement -0.888** -1.93 -27.381*** -75.22 
  (0.322) (0.330)   
Underindentification test 3421.29*** 3421.29***   
Overidentification test 52.894*** 165.50   
Observations 20836 20836   
  His Past Week Hours Her Past Week  Hours   
3) Main sample Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement -37.019*** -75.48  -1.285*** -3.17 
  (0.189) (0.222)   
Her Retirement 
 -2.119*** -4.03 -29.808*** -68.67 
  (0.149) (0.189)   
Underindentification test 1.2e+04*** 1.2e+04***   
Overidentification test 99.65*** 149.024***   
Observations 85473 85473   
Mean for spouses aged 59 to < 60  22.07 18.23   
  His Past Week Hours Her Past Week  Hours   
(4) Spouses aged 56-64 years Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement -36.39*** -68.08  -1.022** -2.52 
  (0.421) (0.421)   
Her Retirement -2.28*** -4.33 -28.508*** -65.68 
  (0.305) (0.340)   
Underindentification test  3421.29*** 3421.293***   
Overidentification test 165.50*** 37.721***   
Observations 20836 20836   
Note: Standard errors are provided in brackets.  Percentage changes are calculated at the discontinuity, as the percentage change in 
hours relative to the mean hours and retirement of the group aged 59 to less than 60, as customary in RD applications.  The mean 
of retirement for the sample of couples with both partners aged 59 to less than 60 is, respectively, 0.45 for married men and 0.42 
for married women.  These models include the same covariates as in our preferred specification (see Table ) unless otherwise 
specified. Only the effects of retirement on hours are shown here for conciseness.  
The under-identification test is a Kleibergen-Paap LM test while the over-identification test is a Hansen J statistic. According to 
either test all the models in Table are well identified.  
*** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent and * at the 10 per cent   
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Table 6.  The effect of spouses'retirement on spouses' hours. Instrumental variable estimates (2SLS GMM estimates)  
                                  Specification without accounting for the 1993 policy reform   
  His Usual Hours Her Usual Hours   
  
Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement 
 -33.114*** -76.90 -2.150*** -5.3 
  (0.199) (0.217) 
  
Her Retirement -0.751*** -1.42 -28.228*** -74.0 
  (0.154) (0.186)   
Underindentification test 1.2e+04 1.2e+04   
Overidentification test 69.11 219.113   
Observations 85473 85473   

  

  His Past Week Hours Her Past Week  Hours   
  
Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement -36.943*** -75.32  -1.26*** -3.11 
  (0.191) (0.223)   
Her Retirement -2.224*** -4.23 -29.851*** -68.77 
  (0.151) (0.189)   
Underindentification test 1.2e+04 1.2e+04   
Overidentification test 57.955  100.015   
Observations 85473 85473   
Note: Standard errors are provided in brackets.  Percentage changes are calculated at the discontinuity, as the percentage change in 
hours relative to the mean hours and retirement of the group aged 59 to less than 60, as customary in RD applications.  These 
models include the same covariates as in our preferred specification (see Table ) unless otherwise specified. Only the effects of 
retirement on hours are shown here for conciseness.  
The under-identification test is a Kleibergen-Paap LM test while the over-identification test is a Hansen J statistic. According to 
either test all the models in Table are well identified.  
*** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent and * at the 10 per cent   

 
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Table 7.  The effect of spouses'retirement on spouses' hours. Instrumental variable estimates   
  Sample of married couples including dual-earner, retiree, and other inactive spouses  
  His Usual Hours Her Usual Hours   
  
Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement 
 -27.929*** -82.44 -7.048*** -38.12 
  (0.138) (0.162) 
  
Her Retirement -0.328** -0.45 -14.763*** -37.0 
  (0.120) (0.170)   
Underindentification test 2.2e+04***  2.2e+04***   
Overidentification test  927.352*** 2117.72***   
Observations 143982 143982   
Mean for spouses aged 59 to < 60  13.89 7.58   
    
  His Past Week Hours Her Past Week  Hours   
  
Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement -31.512*** -75.78 -6.651*** -32.77 
  (0.140) (.169)   
Her Retirement -1.381*** -1.54 -15.615*** -35.66 
  (0.127) (0.178)   
Underindentification test 2.2e+04*** 2.2e+04***   
Overidentification test 1024.49***  1836.02***   
Observations 143982 143982   
Mean for spouses aged 59 to < 60  17.05 8.32   
    
Note: Standard errors are provided in brackets.  Percentage changes are calculated at the discontinuity, as the percentage change in 
hours relative to the mean hours and retirement of the group aged 59 to less than 60, as customary in RD applications.  The mean 
of retirement for the sample of couples with both partners aged 59 to less than 60  is, respectively, 0.41 for married men and 0.19 
for married women (the mean of non-employment, which includes other inactive and retiree, is, respectively, 0.57 for married 
men, and 0.73 for married women). These models include the same covariates as in our preferred specification (see Table ) unless 
otherwise specified. Only the effects of retirement on hours are shown here for conciseness.  
The under-identificaction test is a Kleibergen-Paap LM test while the over-identification test is a Hansen J statistic. According to 
either test all the models in Table are well identified.  
*** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent and * at the 10 per cent   

 
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Table 8.  The effect of spouses' retirement on spouses' hours. Instrumental variable estimates   
 Sample of dual-earner and retiree married couples with the wife at least two years older than the husband 
  His Usual Hours Her Usual Hours   
  
Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement 
 -32.166*** -74.96 -0.398 -1.02 
  (0.719) (0.373) 
  
Her Retirement -3.088*** -6.72 -29.071*** -79.86 
  (0.990) (0.631)    
Underindentification test 1163.805***  1163.805***   
Overidentification test 64.989** 51.94**   
Observations 7977 7977   
Mean for spouses aged 59 to < 60    
    
  His Past Week Hours Her Past Week  Hours   
  
Coefficient estimate Percentage change Coefficient estimate Percentage change 
His Retirement -35.133*** -71.63 -1.23*** -3.03 
  (0.711) (0.351)   
Her Retirement -4.19*** -7.97 -28.731*** -66.19 
  (0.939) (0.638)   
Underindentification test  1163.805*** 1163.805***   
Overidentification test 53.776** 55.089**   
Observations 7977 7977   
Mean for spouses aged 59 to < 60    
    
Note: Standard errors are provided in brackets.  Percentage changes are calculated at the discontinuity, as the percentage change in 
hours relative to the mean hours and retirement of the group aged 59 to less than 60 for the main sample (since this subsample gets 
really too small for this subgroup).  The mean of retirement for the sample of couples with both partners aged 59 to less than 60 
(349 couples) is, respectively, 0.45 for married men and 0.42 for married women.  These models include the same covariates as in 
our preferred specification (see Table ) unless otherwise specified. Only the effects of retirement on hours are shown here for 
conciseness.  
The under-identification test is a Kleibergen-Paap LM test while the over-identification test is a Hansen J statistic. According to 
either test all the models in Table are well identified.  
*** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent and * at the 10 per cent   
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Table A. Appendix. Estimates of  Linear Retirement Probability: first stage regressions  

  

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$8
$
04
  

740=?$89 70=?$89 740=@$89 70=$89 7404@$89 704$89
(1-Df ) (Agef-60) 

0@ 0?88 048 0@= $0@? 04
  

7089 70=@9 7089 70=@9 7049 709
(1-Df ) (Agef-60)2 

$0?? 08? 0= 0 $0@ $0@
  

70?=9 70@89 70?=9 70@889 709 708?9
(1-Df) (Agef-60)3 

04 04= 08= 08? $0@8= $0
  

7049 7049 7049 704?9 7089 70?49
(1-Df) (Agef-60)4  

0?$8 408@$8 0=$8 0$8 $0?4$8
$
0
  

780=?$89 70?$89 780=@$89 70$89 70$89 70$89
P93 Dm (Agem-60) 084= $048 088 $048

  
  

7049 704?9 70489 704?9 
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Table A. Appendix. Continued.  Linear Retirement Probability: first stage regressions 
P93 Dm (Agem-60)2 $04=8 0@= $0 08

  
  

709 704?9 7089 704?9

  
P93 Dm (Agem-60)3 088 $0= 08@ $08?

  
  

70=49 7044@9 70=89 7044@9

  
P93 Dm(Agem-60)4  $0 8088$8 $08@ ?0$8

  
  

709 70@9 709 70@9

  
P93 (1-Dm ) (Agem-60) $0 $044@ $0@ $04?4

  
  

704@9 70?@9 704@9 70??9

  
P93 (1-Dm ) (Agem-60)2 $04? $0= $04@ $0==@

  
  

709 70@89 709 70@89

  
P93 (1-Dm) (Agem-60)3 $0? $08 $0@8 $08

  
  

709 709 7049 709

  
P93 (1-Dm) (Agem-60)4  $04 $?08$8 $0@8 $@04$8

  
  

7@0=$89 70=4$89 7@0@$89 70=$89

  
P93 Df (Agef-60) 

80?$8 0?? 04 0?8

  
  

70==9 704=89 7049 704=9

  
P93 Df (Agef-60)2 

$044 $0= $04 $0

  
  

70=49 709 70=9 709

  
P93 Df (Agef-60)3 

088 0=?? 04@ 0=

  
  

708=9 70489 709 70489

  
P93 Df(Agef-60)4  

$404$8 $08= $0$8 $088@

  
  

7=084$89 70=9 7=0$89 70=9

  
P93 (1-Df ) (Agef-60) $08 $0 $04= $0?

  
  

70?9 70=@9 70=9 70=?9

  
P93 (1-Df ) (Agef-60)2 $0?8 $0 $0=? $08

  
  

70@9 70=49 70@=9 70=489

  
P93 (1-Df) (Agef-60)3 $0= $0@4 $0@ $08@

  
  

709 709 709 709

  
P93 (1-Df) (Agef-60)4  $=0$8 $0444 $0@ $04

  
  

70$89 70?=$89 70?$89 70@4$89

  
Covariates (Z)   yes yes no no yes yes 
*** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent and * at the 10 per cent. The covariates included  are 
spouses’ French nationality and education dummies, number of children, local unemployment rate, year and cohort dummies. 
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Table B.  Descriptives: sample of dual-earner, retiree, other inactive, 
married couples with both spouses aged 50 to 70 included.  
  
Husband Wife 
  Mean Standard dev. Mean 
Standard 
dev. 
Age 60.776 5.293 58.617 5.239 
    
Age 60 and above .553 .497 .403 .490 
    
Elementary School 0.531 0.499 0.605 0.488 
    
Middle School 0.292 0.454 0.252 0.434 
    
High School  0.065 0.247 0.075 0.264 
    
College 0.109 0.312 0.063 0.244 
    
French 0.949 0.217 0.957 0.201 
    
Retired .598 .490 .308 .461 
    
Employed  0.337 0.472 0.317 0.465 
    
Other Inactive 0.063 0.244 0.373 0.483 
    
Usual Hours 41.707 11.950 33.837 13.692 
  
  Couple's characteristics   
  Mean Standard dev. 
Married 0.970 0.169   
    
Children number 0.393 0.773   
    
Local U rate  9.368 2.429   
    
Observations no. 148395       
          
Note:  The sample includes all active and inactive partners aged 50 to 70.  It 
includes also cohabitant couples. 
 Hours are averaged over positive values of hours.     
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Table C.  Sample descriptives by retirement status on the two sides of the age cut-off, larger sample 
  Men in a Couple   
  Not Retired Retired  Not Retired  Retired 
  Age 50-59 Age 50-59 Age 60-70 Age 60-70 
Elementary School 0.415 0.494 0.454 0.623 
  (0.492) (0.499) (0.497) (0.484) 
Middle School  0.353 0.364 0.180 0.245 
  (0.478) (0.481) (0.384) (0.430) 
High School 0.077 0.068 0.080 0.055 
  (0.267) (0.251) (0.271) (0.228) 
College 0.150 0.071 0.280 0.074 
  (0.357) (0.257) (0.449) (0.262) 
French 0.944 0.970 0.877 0.962 
  (0.228) (0.170) (0.327) (0.192) 
Children number 0.636 0.396 0.456 0.217 
  (0.922) (0.768) (0.868) (0.579) 
Local U rate 9.274 9.494 9.301 9.419 
  (2.44) (2.429) (2.409) (2.419) 
Observations no.   53943 12271 5607 76574 
  Women in a Couple   
  Not Retired Retired  Not Retired  Retired 
  Age 50-59 Age 50-59 Age 60-70 Age 60-70 
Elementary School 0.560 0.424 0.723 0.668 
  (0.496) (0.494) (0.447) (0.470) 
Middle School  0.280 0.303 0.183 0.223 
  (0.449) (0.459) (.0387) -0.416 
High School 0.083 0.133 0.053 0.061 
  (0.276) (0.340) (0.224) (0.240) 
College 0.074 0.137 0.036 0.044 
  (0.261) (0.344) (0.188) (0.205) 
French 0.944 0.983 0.944 0.986 
  -0.228 (0.126) (0.228) (0.114) 
Children number 0.573 0.271 0.229 0.126 
  (0.903) (0.598) (0.583) (0.402) 
Local U rate 9.324 9.236 9.639 9.338 
  (2.4349) ( 2.402) (2.492) (2.379) 
Observations no. 81619 6934 20972 38870 
Note:  The sample includes all active and inactive partners aged 50 to 70, married or 
unmarried. The total sample size is 148 395 observations. 
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Table  D.   Descriptives of treatment and control group.  
Dual-earners or retiree married couples with spouses of all ages.  
    
  Husband control group Husband treatment group   
  Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation   
Elementary School 0.543 0.498 0.266 0.442   
    
Middle School  0.274 0.446 0.438 0.496   
    
High School 0.075 0.264 0.109 0.311   
    
College 0.103 0.304 0.185 0.388   
    
French 0.969 0.171 0.956 0.202   
    
Children number 0.646 0.96 1.291 1.065   
    
Local U rate 8.851 2.284 9.554 2.409   
    
Observations number 157970 164244   
  Wife control group Wife treatment group   
  Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation   
Elementary School 0.557 0.496 0.298 0.457   
  
  
Middle School  0.255 0.436 0.357 0.479   
  
  
High School 0.102 0.303 0.175 0.38   
  
  
College 0.081 0.273 0.168 0.374   
  
  
French 0.977 0.149 0.964 0.184   
  
  
Children number 0.67 0.971 1.235 1.072   
  
  
Local U rate 8.802 2.27 9.558 2.407   
  
  
Observations number 148583 173631   
            
Note: The sample includes dual-earner or retiree married couples of all ages: 322 214 couples. 
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Table E.  Raw differences-in-differences of the 1993 policy change on own retirement.                      
Dual-earners or retiree married couples with spouses of all ages. 
Sample means of own retirement   
Husbands Younger Cohorts 1990-1993 Older Cohorts 1990-1993 
  0.015 0.892   
Husbands Younger Cohorts 1994 Older Cohorts 1994 
  0.036 0.968   
Husbands Younger Cohorts, 1994-1996 Older Cohorts, 1994-1996 
  0.055 0.976   
Husbands Younger Cohorts, 1994-2002 Older Cohorts, 1994-2002 
  0.119 0.986   
Wives Younger Cohorts 1990-1993 Older Cohorts 1990-1993 
  0.018 0.877   
Wives Younger Cohorts 1994 Older Cohorts 1994 
  0.037 0.949   
Wives Younger Cohorts 1994-1996 Older Cohorts 1994-1996 
  0.053 0.961   
Wives Younger Cohorts, 1994-2002 Older Cohorts, 1994-2002 
  0.115 0.979   
  Own Raw linear difference-in-differences estimates 
  Estimate St. Error Significance 
Husbands, policy year -0.055 (0.003) *** 
Husbands, over three years  -0.044 (0.002) *** 
Husbands, over nine years  0.01 (0.002) *** 
Wives, policy year -0.05 (0.003) *** 
Wives, over three years  -0.049 (0.002) *** 
Wives, over nine years  -0.005 (0.002) *** 
The sample includes dual-earner and retiree spouses of all ages (see Table 3).   
Note: *** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level.  
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Table F. Probit models of differences-in-differences    
Dual-earners or retiree married couples with spouses of all ages. 
  
Marginal Effects of the 1993 Policy Change  on the Own Retirement Probability 
  Estimate St. Error Significance 
Husbands, policy year -0.039 (0.007) *** 
    
Husbands, over three years  -0.038 (0.006) *** 
    
Husbands, over nine years  -0.039 (0.007) *** 
    
Wives, policy year -0.027 (0.006) *** 
    
Wives, over three years  -0.028 (0.005) *** 
    
Wives, over nine years  -0.045 (0.006) *** 
    
The probits of retirement include  -in addition to birth cohort and year dummies-  controls for 
education dummies, nationality, local unemployment rate and number of children younger 
than 18.   
The sample includes dual-earner and retiree spouses of all ages. 
Note: *** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level.  
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Table  G.    Cross raw differences-in-differences of the effect of the 1993 reform on retirement.  
 Dual-earners or retiree married couples with spouses of all ages. 
 
 
 
Sample Means of Own  Retirement when the Spouse is affected by the policy 
  
Wife Y. Cohorts 1990-1993 Wife O. Cohorts 1990-1993   
Husbands R. 0.054 0.917   
  Wife Y.  Cohorts 1994 Wife O. Cohorts 1994   
Husbands R. 0.090 0=   
  Wife Y.  Cohorts, 1994-1996 Wife O. Cohorts, 1994-1996   
Husbands R 0.106 0.970   
  Wife Y. Cohorts, 1994-2002 Wife O. Cohorts, 1994-2002   
Husbands R 0.167 0.982   
Wives R. 
 
Husband Y. Cohorts 1990-
1993 Husband O. Cohorts 1990-1993 
  0.017 0.778   
Wives R. Husband Y. Cohorts 1994 Husband O. Cohorts 1994   
  0.031 0.854   
Wives R. 
Husband Y. Cohorts 1994-
1996 Husband O. Cohorts 1994-1996 
  0.04 0.877   
Wives R. Husband Y. Cohorts, 1994-2002 Husband O. Cohorts, 1994-2002 
   0.088 0.921   
  Cross raw linear difference-in-differences    
  Estimate St. Error Significance   
Husbands, policy year -0.007 (0.0038) *   
    
Husbands, over three years  -0.0010 (0.002)   
    
Husbands, over nine years  0.048 (0.002) ***   
    
Wives, policy year -0.06 (0.003) ***   
    
Wives, over three years  -0.076 (0.002) ***   
    
Wives, over nine years  -0.072 (0.001) ***   
The sample includes dual-earner and retiree spouses of all ages.     
Note: *** stands for statistical significance at the 1 per cent level.    
Y. Young and O. Old.  
We measure here the raw effects on the husband’s (wife’ s) retirement probability of the fact that 
their partner is concerned by the 1993 policy change.  These are indirect (cross) effects of the 
policies on spouses’ retirement.   
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